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Abstract. This essay, written on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of Mariano Artigas’s 
death, examines Artigas’s engagement with analytic philosophy in his philosophy of 
science. I argue that, overall, Artigas’s project in the philosophy of science is one of—
using his own metaphor—‘building bridges’ between distinct areas of knowledge. After 
reviewing the function of Artigas’s philosophy of science as a bridge between science 
and philosophy, I analyse how he moved from classical to analytic philosophy. I then 
assess the extent to which Artigas’s work conforms to reasonable analytic standards 
of clarity and precision, which can be expected from work in the philosophy of science. 
I conclude that, while Artigas’s dedication and production were admirable, his work 
remains essentially unfinished, thus inviting further research that should develop and 
clarify his conception of science, of its aims, its methods, progress, and of how science 
leads to knowledge. I attempt to assess Artigas’s philosophy of science from an objec-
tive and detached perspective. Thus the essay should be of interest to both scholars in 
the philosophy of science, as well as to those generally interested in Artigas-scholarship.
Keywords: philosophy of science; Artigas; analytic philosophy.
Introduction
It is both an honour and a pleasure to contribute this essay for a special 
issue on the philosophical work of Professor Mariano Artigas. It is an honour, 
because I have always admired the work of this great inspirer of Spanish 
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philosophy of science. And it is a pleasure, because the occasion has given 
me the opportunity to think about some issues springing forth from Artigas’ 
work which, I think, can be of interest to those engaging with the relations 
between natural science and philosophy today, as well as on the place of 
analytic philosophy in the Western philosophical landscape.
Given the occasion, it seems appropriate to add here a brief personal 
note, which will inform what I will have to say later on. I have admired 
Artigas’ work for as long as I recall having an intellectual life—i.e. since 
my teenage years, when I read Artigas’ popular articles on physics and 
philosophy, as well as some of his books, in particular Artigas (1984) and 
Artigas et al. (1984). Here was a philosopher who was also a scientist, and 
who wrote in an accessible and informed manner about important scientific 
issues bearing on philosophy. Though I never met him personally, I found 
in his writings a source of inspiration which exerted an influence on my 
professional path. I believe that Artigas has inspired many others in the 
same way.
In this essay I will analyse and reflect on Artigas’ engagement with 
analytic philosophy (for more on this notion: see Section 2). Despite Artigas’s 
being a philosopher trained in the Aristotelian and Thomistic tradition, he 
felt the need to engage with a philosophical tradition different from his 
own. As I will argue in Section 1, Artigas’ openness towards the analytic 
tradition is an important trait of his general philosophical attitude: he was, 
using a metaphor of his own, a ‘builder of bridges’.
Analytic philosophy is nowadays increasingly prominent in areas, such 
as metaphysics, which lie well beyond the traditional areas of analytic phi-
losophy, which used to be largely concerned with epistemology, philosophy 
of language, philosophy of science, and philosophy of mind. For instance, 
Glock writes:
Analytic philosophy is roughly 100 years old, and it is now the dominant 
force within Western philosophy. It has prevailed for several decades in the 
English-speaking world; it is in the ascendancy in Germanophone countries; 
and it has made significant inroads even in places once regarded as hostile, 
such as France. (Glock 2008, 1)
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Though it is not far from the truth, calling analytic philosophy “the 
dominant force within Western philosophy” may not be entirely uncon-
troversial. In any case, analytic methods and modes of thinking are indeed 
increasingly prevalent in philosophy today. It is therefore important to take 
notice of the way in which, and the aims for which, Artigas turned to this 
particular philosophical tradition in a relatively late stage of his career.
I should here make a few clarifications regarding the scope of my 
essay. First of all, I wish to mention that I am neither an Artigas scholar 
nor one of his students: and that, accordingly—though I have spoken 
to some of the philosophers who were his students and colleagues at 
the University of Navarre—my interpretation of Artigas’s philosophical 
thought is exclusively based on his written work. Second, though I will 
study Artigas’s engagement with analytic philosophy, the current essay 
does not claim (nor does it attempt!) to be a paper in ‘analytic philosophy’ 
(see Section 2.1 for my construal of this term). Though I will indeed engage 
in an analysis—which, given the word limit, will be necessarily brief—of 
some of Artigas’s work, my perspective will be largely normative. I will 
take Artigas’s work as an opportunity to reflect about how the philosophy 
of science could be done, or ought to be done, in light of Artigas’s own 
history and his own philosophical project. So it might be read as an essay 
in the meta-philosophy of science.
Sections 1 and 2 are introductory. In Section 1, I characterise Artigas’s 
general approach to philosophy of science in terms of his own metaphor 
of ‘building bridges’. For the present essay, the relevant bridge will be one 
built from classical to analytic philosophy. In Section 2, after clarifying 
what I mean by the phrase ‘analytic philosophy’, I explore the extent to 
which Artigas (2001) and, especially, Artigas (2006) can be seen to be such 
a bridge. In Section 3, which forms the main section of the paper, I appraise 
the extent to which Artigas succeeded at actually building such a bridge. 
The last section concludes.
My essay does not attempt to be an exposition of Artigas’s philosophy 
of science (though I will outline some of its general aspects in Sections 1, 
2.2, and 3.2), nor a defence of the relevance of his aims today, which I take to 
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be obvious to the reader of Artigas. My aim is instead critical, and attempts 
to argue that Artigas’s work needs revision.
1. Artigas’s philosophy of science
In Section 1.1, I characterise Artigas’s overall philosophical project as one 
of, using his own metaphor, ‘building bridges’: specifically, Artigas sees 
philosophy as a bridge between science and religion. In the same way, his 
own philosophy of science can be seen as a bridge between science and 
philosophy: and I argue this in three points, which form a bridge from 
philosophy to science. In Section 1.2, I introduce the theme for the rest of 
the essay: viz. Artigas’s engagement with analytic philosophy.
1.1. Philosophy and philosophy of science as bridges
In this subsection, I will discuss Artigas’ overall philosophical project in 
relation to science. For the characterisation which I will give, of Artigas as 
a builder of bridges, will also apply to the specific work in philosophy of 
science that I will discuss in the rest of the essay.
One of the traits which characterise Artigas, as a thinker, seems to be 
his interest in the dialogue between the different academic disciplines. 
Artigas construes such a dialogue not as an improvised exchange of ideas, 
or as a superficial round-table discussion on some common issues of 
interest, between disciplines which tend to be too far apart to understand 
each other’s languages. Nor does he, in any way, advocate for the abolition 
or the transgression of the boundaries which exist between the disciplines, 
as if the mere removal of whatever institutional of social impediments 
may divide the disciplines, sufficed to bridge the deep cultural divides over 
method and values which are still prevalent.
Rather, Artigas realizes that such dialogue must be carefully crafted 
and requires specific tools and new forms of expression which must be 
developed for the task at hand. So, in Artigas (2001, 20), he proposes to use 
philosophy for the task of building bridges between science and religion. 
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For Artigas, such bridges cannot be built in an ad hoc manner but must, for 
their fruitfulness, and given the difficulty of the task, be built systematically: 
and so he engages in a search for ‘boundary questions’ between science and 
religion, which then bring him to the discovery of some natural places for 
building such bridges.
I submit that Artigas’s philosophy of science, as a whole, can, and should, 
also be seen in the light of his bridge metaphor. Artigas’s approach to 
philosophy is distinguished by his profound knowledge of both philosophy 
and natural science. This knowledge is evinced by, but not limited to, his 
holding doctorates in both physics (1968) and in philosophy (1979), both 
from the University of Barcelona. But Artigas’s knowledge of science is 
best appreciated from a study of his philosophical work. His writings in the 
philosophy of science make essential use of the history of science, including 
its recent history, which he shows to know broadly, as well as in depth. Thus 
Artigas’ philosophy of science is no erudite reflection on matters learned 
from books: it is a reflection on the trade which he once learned, and which 
he himself practiced: and it is fed by his deep knowledge of the history of 
science. As such (though I am not aware of his discussing this explicitly: as 
I will explain in the next few paragraphs, his overall project does exemplify 
this) Artigas’s philosophy of science could potentially help bridge some 
gaps between science and philosophy.1
There are three main reasons why Artigas’s philosophy of science is, 
in principle, well placed to fulfil this role of a bridge between science and 
philosophy (focusing, for brevity, on how Artigas’s philosophy of science 
is conversant with science and with scientists, rather than on the opposite 
direction: for that direction, see Section 3):
(i) Artigas’s philosophy of science is rooted in actual science, and 
it takes into account both the theoretical and the experimental 
practices of science: so it is well conversant with the sciences.
1 The theme does recur frequently, though implicitly, in Artigas’s work. For he often com-
ments on scientists who make philosophical statements, sometimes without realising 
that they are doing so, or without the kind of conceptual precision expected in philosoph-
ical matters.
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(ii) Artigas endorses a form of realism that is not naïve, yet will be 
pleasing to many practicing scientists because it reflects a ‘common 
sense’ view on science (more on this in Section 3) to which most 
practicing scientists subscribe. So Artigas converses well with the 
scientists.
(iii) Artigas’s philosophy of science lacks the kind of technical and 
linguistic sophistication of other philosophical work that sometimes 
alienates working scientists. In other respects, though, this lack 
of sophistication can also be a drawback (more on this issue in 
Section 3.2).
Though I am not aware of an explicit declaration of intent for Artigas’s 
philosophy of science to fulfil this bridge function between science and 
philosophy, it is clear from his overall philosophical project, as well as from 
his detailed methodology, that Artigas was, in fact, so motivated.
I have discussed the implicit bridge function which Artigas’s philosophy 
of science could fulfil, as a bridge between science and philosophy. In the 
rest of this essay, I wish to focus on a second, more specific, bridge function 
of Artigas’s philosophy of science (and of Artigas as an author), viz. between 
classical and analytic philosophy.
1.2. A bridge from classical to analytic philosophy
In this subsection, I will apply the bridge metaphor to Artigas’s philosophy 
of science, relative to classical (understood, as remarked before, as the 
Aristotelian and scholastic tradition) and analytic philosophy. The study 
of bridges between classical and analytic philosophy is of course a broad 
topic. Accordingly, the task of starting to build such a bridge can appear to 
be daunting. Furthermore, it is not a priori clear that this bridge will be of 
the same kind as the bridge which was discussed in the previous subsection. 
Philosophy of science, regarded as a bridge between science and philosophy, 
goes both ways: from science to philosophy, and from philosophy to science. 
Clearly, the philosopher of science who wishes to mediate between the two 
disciplines will need to talk to both of them.
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Let me expand on the obvious objection to this project: for it is not 
immediately clear that the same reciprocity applies to the relation be-
tween classical philosophy and analytic philosophers. After all: analytic 
philosophers receive, as a rule—and leaving exceptions aside—training in 
classical philosophy: and during that training they read the main ancient 
Greek philosophers, at the very least. The same is not necessarily true of 
classically trained philosophers regarding analytic philosophy. Classically 
trained philosophers may have read a few of the philosophers who usually 
classify as ‘analytic’ (see Section 2), e.g. Wittgenstein, Popper, or perhaps 
Quine, but their knowledge of other analytic philosophers if often from 
secondary, rather than from primary, sources: secondary sources which 
have often been written by other classically trained philosophers, not 
necessarily from a sympathetic perspective (for more on this, see the last 
paragraph of Section 3.2).
This asymmetry of the two relata may in fact be true, and it might be 
an important consideration to take into account in a detailed attempt at 
developing the metaphor of the philosophy of science as a bridge between 
classical and analytic philosophy. But since it is not my aim here to system-
atically develop the bridge metaphor further, we will take the remarks in 
the previous paragraph in our stride. For my purpose is to analyse Artigas’s 
engagement with analytic philosophy, in the forward direction: from classical 
to analytic philosophy, i.e. from the point of view of a classical philosopher 
who becomes conversant with the analytic world (rather than both ways). 
Indeed, this is the direction of the motion which is most visible in Artigas’s 
writings, and it coincides with his own philosophical autobiography: being 
a classically trained philosopher, he retrained himself in several respects, 
engaging with parts of the analytic tradition relating to the philosophy 
of science. Thus I will leave aside the question of how Artigas’s work was 
actually received in e.g. the English-speaking countries, as irrelevant for 
my purposes here (though, in Section 3, I will discuss whether Artigas 
accommodates to common standards of analytic philosophy, and will 
comment on the extent to which Artigas’s work seems convincing, from 
an analytic perspective).
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2. Artigas and analytic philosophy
In this Section, I describe in more detail the extent of Artigas’s engagement 
with analytic philosophy. First, in Section 2.1, I will define what I mean, 
broadly, by ‘analytic philosophy’. Then, in Section 2.2, I will analyse the 
motion towards analytic philosophy in some of Artigas’s work, and will 
mention three specific points in which Artigas’s work can be seen as a bridge 
from classical to analytic philosophy.
2.1. What is analytic philosophy?
Before we proceed, I should clarify what I mean by ‘analytic philosophy’: 
which is, of course, a broad and much disputed term. Much has been written 
about what, if anything, defines analytic philosophy: and whether the term, 
used as referring to a particular school of thought, makes sense at all. I claim 
that the term indeed does make sense, as I will next briefly argue. For more 
details, and for a detailed argument to the effect that the term indeed makes 
sense, see, for instance, Glock (2008, Chapter 1).
Glock argues that, despite the difficulties in providing an analytic 
definition of ‘analytic philosophy’ (where, by an ‘analytic definition’, he 
means pointing to sufficient and necessary conditions for a philosopher to 
qualify as analytic), a real definition can and must nevertheless be given: one 
which applies to e.g. actual philosophers and institutions self-identifying 
as ‘analytic’. Glock (2008, Chapter 8) proposes to define analytic philosophy 
through a combination of ‘family resemblances’ (see below) and a historical, 
or genetic, condition.
I do not consider analytic philosophy to be a well-defined school, theory, 
or method, in the same way in which that may be the case for, say, analytic 
chemistry, or analytic mechanics. Rather, I take analytic philosophy to be 
a certain philosophical tradition, originating in a number of historical figures 
who developed particular approaches to philosophy: approaches which 
include methodological aspects and matters of style, as well as matters 
of content. These ‘approaches’ can be characterised by what Glock calls, 
borrowing a well-known term from Wittgenstein, ‘family resemblances’. 
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For the purposes of this essay, I will basically endorse Glock’s characteri-
sation of analytic philosophy, thus construed. Thus, analytic philosophy is 
standardly traced back to a number of certain philosophers: Frege, Moore, 
Russell, Wittgenstein, the Vienna Circle, etc. They constitute what Glock calls 
‘paradigmatic cases’ of the analytic tradition. Other analytic philosophers 
bear family resemblances to these paradigmatic cases: they use the same 
or similar methods, theories, and philosophical style. Some general traits 
are indeed readily recognised: there is an emphasis on the use of logic in 
philosophy, a centrality of the method analysis (including, but not limited 
to, linguistic analysis), they are often science-oriented, and their style 
aspires at achieving clarity and argumentative rigour. As mentioned in the 
Introduction, in the second half of the 20th century, analytic philosophers 
turned to other areas of philosophy, including metaphysics.
2.2. From classical to analytic philosophy
As I mentioned in Sections 1 and 2, Artigas was a classically trained phi-
losopher. More specifically, his early work fits with the neo-Aristotelian 
tradition. His doctoral thesis, Artigas (1963), was a study of the applicability 
of the scholastic concept of substance to elementary particles, as described 
by modern physics. His early work Introduction to Philosophy (Artigas (1984), 
too, is firmly rooted in the Aristotelian and scholastic tradition. Though 
Artigas engages dialectically with modern authors such as Descartes, Kant, 
and the Vienna Circle: his main conversation, in that early period, is with 
the Aristotelian and Thomistic tradition. Artigas (1984) follows closely 
a well-known scheme in the introduction to philosophy, resembling e.g. 
Jacques Maritain’s An introduction to philosophy (1962). It is telling that his 
introductory chapter on the philosophy of logic makes no reference at all to 
Frege or Russell, and makes only a passing reference to the Vienna Circle.
More than fifteen years after his first doctoral dissertation, he wrote 
a doctoral thesis on “The trustworthiness of science and its philosophical 
impact” (Artigas 1979), which led to a published book on Popper, and 
presumably strongly influenced his later work.
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Artigas’s later work on philosophy of science seems to have gained in 
depth, compared to his early publications. I have here in mind Artigas (2001) 
and Artigas (2006).2 Three points are apparent from these works, especially 
the latter (on which the rest of the essay will focus), which can indeed be 
seen as bridges from classical to analytic philosophy:
(i) Artigas (2006) makes a conscious attempt at a systematic study of 
science: of its aims (Chapter 1), the kinds of activities which make 
up science (Chapter 2), the scientific method (Chapter 3), the 
relation between science, truth, and objectivity (Chapters 4–6), 
the progress of science (Chapter 7), and the philosophical impact 
of science (Chapter 8). This book could be compared, in its aims 
and its scope, to other classic works of philosophy of science such 
as Kuhn (1962) and Laudan (1978), one important difference being 
that Artigas assumes a realist epistemology (and, as I will argue in 
3.2.5, this is one of the more problematic aspects of the book).
(ii) Artigas’ approach is systematic but also history-based. He illustrates 
each concept and point of his philosophical system with actual 
examples from the history of science.
(iii) Artigas explicitly converses with the philosophy of science in the 
analytic tradition. For instance, he quotes and discusses extensively 
authors such as Carnap, Giere, Hempel, Kuhn, Laudan, Neurath, 
Lakatos, Popper, Putnam, Quine, Reichenbach, Russell, Schlick, van 
Fraassen, and many others.3 Thus, Artigas’s philosophy of science 
can be seen as responding to these authors and incorporating some 
of their insights (cf. the last paragraph of Section 3.2).
Thus, when attempting to build his systematic account of science in his 
later years, we find Artigas turning to the analytic philosophical tradition 
for philosophical conversation. This is not to say that Artigas became an 
analytic philosopher—which he, indeed, never was, as I will argue in the next 
Section. Rather, Artigas combined the classical tradition with a discussion 
2 I will not be here concerned with the personal or historical causes of this change in Arti-
gas’s thinking, about which Artigas-scholars may be better informed than I am.
3 This list includes authors discussed in both Artigas (2001) and Artigas (2006).
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of contemporary philosophy of science. One should add here that Artigas’s 
use of classical philosophy was never naïve or uncritical: indeed, his attempt 
at building a theory of contextual truth and contextual realism, applied to 
science, should be seen as critical of naïve correspondence theories of truth, 
and therefore as genuinely modern.
3. In praise of Artigas
My aim in this section is to praise the master. And I will do so in the best 
way I know of in philosophy, namely by indicating where his thoughts could 
lead, if developed further: perhaps where he himself would have wished 
them to lead him, if he had lived longer. This will entail pointing out some 
of the limitations and, perhaps, some of inconsistencies which one can 
find in Artigas’s thinking: for we can be sure that progress will come from 
overcoming those limitations. Thus the mistakes of the master will point 
ways forward.
In Section 3.1, I will comment on what I take to be reasonable standards 
of clarity and precision which apply to work in the philosophy of science, 
especially (but not exclusively!) in the analytic tradition, construed as in 
Section 2.1. In Section 3.2, I comment in some detail on Artigas (2006), and 
criticise it for its lack of clarity and precision.4
As a first attempt at contextualising Artigas’s potential influence as 
a philosopher, it seems appropriate to use the following quote from White-
head (1928) about the formation of philosophical schools:
4 One should bear in mind that Artigas (2006) is a translation of the 1989 Spanish original. 
Though Artigas’s though may have developed further during that period, Artigas (2006) 
can still be seen as Artigas’s final word on the matters treated in his book, of which later 
work is further elaboration. This follows from (i) The fact that Artigas never published 
again such a systematic work in philosophy of science (his 2007 Oracles of Science book 
concentrates, for instance, on very different aspects of the science-philosophy relation). 
(ii) In the preface to Artigas (2006), he explicitly endorses everything he wrote in 1989: 
“After sixteen years, I still subscribe to everything I wrote in 1989… Therefore, I have 
decided not to change it [the text]”.
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Every philosophical school in the course of its history requires two presiding 
philosophers. One of them under the influence of the main doctrines of the 
school should survey experience with some adequacy, but inconsistently. 
The other philosopher should reduce the doctrines of the school to a rigid 
consistency; he will thereby effect a reductio ad absurdum. No school of thought 
has performed its full service to philosophy until these men have appeared. 
(Whitehead 1978 [89], 57)
The first philosopher of the school tends to have a speculative, bold and 
creative way of philosophising; the second philosopher of the school brings 
the principles of the first to their logical conclusion, often requiring major 
modifications of the master’s doctrines in order to render them consistent. 
Of course, the above is (unlike what Whitehead suggests) not a necessity of 
a philosophical school. But Whitehead’s analysis in the quote does makes 
vivid a pattern in the history of philosophy which is easily recognisable; the 
pattern is particularly visible in the relation between Plato and Aristotle; 
but also between Socrates and Plato, and between Aristotle and Aquinas. 
Whitehead may have seen himself as the first philosopher of the ‘philosophy 
or organism’, as he called his own doctrine. The second philosopher of that 
school apparently has not yet appeared.
The importance of the quote for our subject is that it suggests an 
interesting interpretation of Artigas’s thought. Indeed, I regard Artigas as 
a speculative, bold and synthetic thinker whose ideas could be developed by 
the members of a ‘school’. His attempt at systematisation in Artigas (2006) 
certainly suggests this. But as I will argue in this Section, Artigas’s ways of 
expression are imprecise, and so the development of a ‘school’ based on 
his thought5 would depend entirely on whether the inconsistencies and 
vagueness in his work are exposed—and resolved.
Let me also state clearly that I have no intention of being the second 
philosopher myself. Thus this section should be read as an invitation.
5 I focus, in this essay, on the possibility of developing Artigas’s own thinking. As I men-
tioned before, Artigas’s philosophy of science aims at the kind of systematization that 
would merit being develop by a school. Thus, my comments in the rest of the paper strictly 
relate to this specific philosophical proposal, and not to related attempts by other authors.
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3.1. Aiming at clarity and precision
In the preamble of this Section, I stated that Artigas could potentially be 
seen as the first philosopher of a school, whom Whitehead envisaged. I now 
expound on the reasons for the caveat ‘potentially’.
Remember that, on Whitehead’s conception of a philosophical school, 
there is the requirement of the inconsistency of the first philosopher of the 
school.6 In my opinion, Artigas’s work cannot be yet qualified ‘inconsistent’. 
For a doctrine can only be shown to be inconsistent once it is formulated 
with sufficient precision for its claims to be testable for their logical, lin-
guistic, and conceptual consistency or coherence. But if a doctrine is vague 
or unclear, it is impossible to give a verdict on its consistency.
To illustrate the argument just made: suppose that I make a claim X, and 
that you are to decide whether my claim X is right or wrong. You can only 
reasonably be expected to decide whether I am right or wrong in claiming 
X, once I explain X, and my reasons for believing X, in such a way that its 
meaning becomes clear. If my claim X is so vague or unclear that it can be 
understood in widely differing ways (including ways which are right and 
ways which are wrong), and if my arguments for the claim X are not clearly 
formulated, then the question of consistency does not even arise. Clarity 
about the meaning of X must be reached before consistency can be even 
discussed.
In other words, only once the doctrines of the first philosopher of the 
school have been clarified, can there be a second philosopher who will be 
able to “reduce the doctrines… to a rigid consistency”, and thereby “effect 
6 My use of Whitehead’s conception of, and especially his requirements on, a philosophical 
school, should be seen only as motivational. There is, of course, no literal requirement 
that any philosophical school must contain two philosophers who stand in the exact re-
lation to each other that Whitehead envisages. Rather, I read Whitehead’s conception 
as a helpful metaphor: and (in so far as it can also be interpreted in a normative sense) 
as a practical guideline, the main thrust of which (at least, in so far as the conception 
is important for analysing Artigas) is the idea that every philosophical system contains 
some inconsistencies which are then disputed, and claimed to be resolved, within the 
philosophical school, once the doctrines are systematised by the followers.
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a reductio ad absurdum”. The doctrines must be clear before they can be 
told wrong.
The interpretive principle of charity in philosophical discussion (see e.g. 
Ney 2014, 11) must, of course, also be applied in this work of clarification. 
Given distinct ways of construing a doctrine, we should choose the most 
charitable interpretation—i.e. the one which renders as much of the doctrine, 
as possible, as true. It is not the case that the principle of charity renders 
just about any system true, especially when applied to systematic works, 
such as Artigas (2006), which attempt to give an overall view of an entire 
field of knowledge, viz. natural science. For the history of philosophy shows 
that it is very hard (if possible at all!) to find such systematic expositions 
which are entirely free of inconsistencies and are coherent with the history 
of science. So we should give Artigas (2006) the benefit of the doubt, and 
assume that, if a construal of it exists which renders it approximately true, 
Artigas would have adopted it.
It seems perfectly reasonable to assume that some rendering of Artigas 
(2006) exists which will make it approximately true (and, of course, specifying 
the extent of ‘approximate’ truth is also part of the job to be done: see §3.2.4). 
For Artigas’s is, in many ways, a common sense view, based on real scientific 
experience. Be that as it may: the trouble is, rather, that Artigas (2006) is 
often too vague for the criterion of inconsistency, as just discussed, to apply 
to it in a straightforward way. Indeed, for all its virtues, Artigas (2006) does 
not seem to stand up to common standards of analytic work in the history 
and philosophy of science, as I will illustrate in the next subsection.
3.2. Articulating the criticism
In this section, I criticise five points of Artigas (2006): his notion of natural 
science (3.2.1), his conception of context (3.2.2, 3.2.4), his use of models 
(3.2.3), the role of realism in justifying objectivity (3.2.5), and three more 
general points (3.2.6).
The first problem which the reader of Artigas (2006) encounters is 
a severe problem of translation. Artigas (2006) is the translation of the 
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book which first appeared in Spanish in 1989. Unfortunately, the English 
lacks fluency and is full of neologies and odd phrasings, which make the 
reading tedious.
But more importantly, the content of Artigas (2006) is often vague and 
unclear. Definitions and statements are frequently expounded in terms 
which are ambiguous, and their clarification is often left implicit: apparent 
in specific examples, rather than conceptually. It looks as if the reader is 
expected to have some intuitive grasp of the definitions, which are then 
further fixed in the examples.
Such a method may, of course, be suitable when teaching broad, rather 
than specialised, audiences. But that is not the kind of audience which Artigas 
had in mind, since the book was meant as a scholarly work contributing to 
philosophy of science research: “Dr Artigas’ Spanish original was addressed 
to the community of philosophy of science scholars” (Translator’s Preface, 
my emphasis). And even letting aside the circularity which the method, of 
definitions implicit through examples, may bring in (since the examples serve 
both for making the meaning of the concepts explicit, as well as for their 
testing against history). The lack of clear definitions and of a conceptually 
sound articulation of the different notions, makes the whole theory vague, 
as I will now illustrate with a few examples. It is keeping in mind Artigas’s 
audience, of philosophers of science scholars (and Artigas’s intent of making 
a contribution to the philosophy of science), that I will address my criticism.
3.2.1. The notion of natural science
In Chapter 1, Artigas gives us a definition of experimental science:
The defining characteristic of experimental science is the demand that its 
theoretical contents be related in some manner to experimental control. If this 
demand is satisfied, the theoretical contents permit one to obtain knowledge of 
nature related to controlled domination. The primary definition of experimental 
science, its general goal, can be expressed in function of a methodological 
requirement… Science is a knowledge-seeking activity whose theoretical contents 
are related in a logical and coherent manner to controllable data obtained through 
experimentation. (Artigas 2006, 11, emphasis in the original)
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Intuitively, the definition is clear enough, since it seems to agree with 
some of our intuitive ideas about natural science. But does the definition 
stand, or does it crumble, under the pressure of tough questions? On nar-
rower scrutiny, one wishes to understand in detail the meaning of the terms 
in the definition, so that this notion of natural science can be put to other 
uses in the philosophy of science. Unfortunately, several of the words used 
in this conception are either intrinsically vague (‘related’ seems too generic 
a notion; the same goes for ‘coherent’: how strong is this a requirement?) 
or are used in ways which are ambiguous because not defined or used in 
non-standard ways (‘logic’ is here not used in its literal sense, but in a looser 
sense: Artigas, unfortunately, does not tell us what a ‘logical relation’, on 
his view, looks like). Furthermore, Artigas never told us precisely how he 
construes ‘knowledge’ (more on this in §3.2.2).
One would expect the rest of Chapter 1 to unpack for the reader the 
content of the defining notion at the beginning of the book. Unfortunately, 
Artigas does not do this. He assumes that the reader understands his concept 
of science, and goes on to illustrate it in examples. Nor do the subsequent 
chapters further specify the above notions more precisely.
There is a more basic difficulty with the above definition that recurs 
in later chapters: it is the reference to “experimental control”, in the first 
sentence, and to “controllable data obtained through experimentation”, in 
the last sentence. First of all: many of the data, on which science is based, are 
not obtained through experimentation but through observation. For example, 
there is little cosmological experimentation which one can currently do 
(not to say: none at all!), whereas there is increasingly more observation 
available. Second, the demand for ‘control’ in the above quote is vague: in 
the first sentence it refers to experimental control of the observed system, 
while in the last sentence it refers to the control of the data (but then: what 
would uncontrolled data look like?). (Elsewhere, Artigas seems to have in 
mind mostly experimental control of the observed system. He also uses the 
word ‘domination’).
In fact, it is unclear why science should refer to experimental control or 
domination at all (maybe one reason for the wording is Artigas’s wishing to 
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impose the standard requirement of reproducibility of experiments, but then 
his phrasing is too strong: reproducibility is different from the requirement 
of the availability of experimental control across the board. Furthermore, 
reproducibility is a requirement of a specific method: for instance, the 
GW150914 black hole merger cannot be reproduced, let alone controlled or 
dominated; yet it is a scientific discovery. One should not confuse science 
with one of its methods).
This ambiguity remains unresolved in the rest of the book, and it 
propagates into Artigas’s historical analysis. Because, on the one hand, 
Artigas argues that ‘real’, or ‘fully developed’, modern science, appears 
around 1600: so his restriction of the notion of science, to those branches 
of knowledge in which one is able to carry out experiments, makes sense. 
But that very stipulation rules out from natural science several important 
disciplines (such as astronomy, geology, and parts of biology) in which: 
(i) observation, rather than experimentation, is the rule; and (ii) in which 
the system under study (e.g. a distant black hole) cannot be controlled. And 
so his own definition rules out disciplines which we normally, qua natural 
science, think of as belonging in the same category as experimental physics.
A related problem is in the phrase ‘experimental science’ as the object 
of study of the philosophy of science. As just argued, not all natural science 
is experimental: much of it is observational. (A term that captures both 
experimentation and observation is ‘empirical’). But since all of natural 
science contains both empirical and theoretical aspects, it is misleading 
(one-sided) to construe philosophy of science as philosophy of experimental 
science. ‘Natural science’ would have been a more appropriate term for 
Artigas’s object of investigation.
3.2.2. The conception of ‘context’
Another vague notion, which is furthermore a key ingredient of Artigas’s 
system and is used throughout, is that of ‘context’. Contextuality is intro-
duced in Chapter 2:
General principles and theoretical systems provide profound explanations 
and permit efficacious study of a large variety of problems. The results are 
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contextually valid, relative to contexts of the problems and methods. Describing 
the validity [of the explanations] as contextual does not imply a relativism 
undervaluing the cognitive reach of science. Authentic knowledge is obtained. 
This knowledge is partial and contextual, which only implies that its validity is 
judged taking into account the problems to which this knowledge refers and the 
conceptual and experimental means employed. (Artigas 2006, 51, my emphasis)
This notion of contextual validity is, of course, a notion to which uncritical 
common sense easily agrees: for most of the knowledge that we possess 
is, in some sense, contextual: and this is true not only in science, but in 
everyday life as well: thus underlining the continuity between the two kinds 
of knowledge. But in philosophy we are interested not just in confirming 
our common sense intuitions, but in developing rigorous notions which 
can then succeed or fail when we apply them to some new, tough cases. 
Unfortunately, Artigas never goes on to define what he means by ‘context’ 
with sufficient precision.
In the above quote, ‘context’ seems roughly interchangeable with ‘scien-
tific problems under study and methods’. But that qualification seems both 
too broad and almost empty. First: Is a scientific explanation, from its very 
nature, not always an explanation relative to a scientific problem (or a given 
class of problems)? Second, and more importantly: it is not clear what is 
meant by truth that is contextual with respect to a method. Does contextual 
truth cease to be contextually true if e.g. a different method (of investigation, 
or of verification) is used? Third: in the inference from the first part of 
the quote above to the second, Artigas attempts to move from contextual 
knowledge to some kind of objective knowledge (which he dubs ‘authentic 
knowledge’). But the inference does not seem to follow, at least not without 
further clarification. Just how does the inference, that contextual validity 
does not imply relativism, precisely work? We are not told: presumably 
because this step could only be justified in the context of a more general 
epistemology (not just a specific epistemology of science), which Artigas 
does not develop. (This is supposed to be the topic of Chapters 5 and 6, but 
the inference will not be explained there satisfactorily either: see §3.2.5).
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3.2.3. Models and the scientific method
In Section 3.2, Artigas articulates his conception of the scientific method. He 
introduces a number of notions: some familiar, like ‘theory’ and ‘hypothesis’; 
others more specific to his own account, like ‘scientific object’ and ‘basic 
predicate’. (In what follows, I will often refer to the elements of Artigas’s 
analysis of science as ‘factors’). In particular, Artigas introduces the notion 
of ‘model’. Of course, talk of ‘models’ is widespread in the philosophy of 
science literature, and models figure prominently in the work of e.g. Nancy 
Cartwright. Models are used to fill the gap existing between theory and 
phenomena, so that the theory can be applied to specific phenomena. And 
models are usually construed as, roughly, simplified conceptual schemes 
which: (i) capture, i.e. represent in their essential details, specific scientific 
phenomena; (ii) the representation is such that it illustrates or exemplifies 
the theory, i.e. the theory can be applied to it: under specific physical 
assumptions, and using appropriate methods of approximation. Thus, 
on this generic conception in the philosophy of science, models mediate 
between theory and phenomena. In the philosophy of physics literature, 
the use of ‘models’ is more specific: models are solutions to the dynamical 
equations a theory, i.e. concrete instantiations of the theory, in terms of 
solutions to equations.
In order for the concept of a ‘model’ to do any philosophical work, it 
needs to be defined. Unfortunately, Artigas does not provide us a definition, 
but only examples (e.g. the corpuscular kinetic model used in thermodynam-
ics to study gases: Artigas 2006, 65). He also does not seem to endorse the 
general notion, nor the more specific notion, just mentioned: instead, Artigas 
seems to assume the physicists’ informal use of ‘model’. Unfortunately, such 
use is insufficient for the kind of philosophical work which Artigas wants 
the concept to do for him: since he will later claim that models have both 
‘reference’ and ‘meaning’. Furthermore, he is not consistent even relative to 
the physicist’s use of ‘model’, since he later talks (e.g. on pp. 167 and 170) of 
the ‘corpuscular model’ and the ‘wave model’ (of matter): while physicists 
usually talk about corpuscular and wave descriptions of matter. The reason 
why physicists nowadays talk about descriptions rather than models of 
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matter is that, after the developments of modern quantum theory, the 
meaning differs from other well-known cases (like Bohr’s model of the atom).
Turning to philosophy: the precise function of models as mediators 
between theory and phenomena, for Artigas, remains unclear. Also, models 
do not seem to play any important role in subsequent sections: for instance, 
when, in Section 3.3, Artigas discusses the formation of theories, and in 
Section 3.4 the confirmation and validity of theories, he does not mention 
the role of models at all. So why introduce this notion in the first place? It 
seems that there is too much arbitrariness in the set of notions considered, 
and different parts of his system are not well articulated.
3.2.4. Partial truth and context: the succession of theories
In Section 6.2, Artigas uses the adjectives ‘contextual’ and ‘partial’ to refer 
to truth. He does not define ‘partial’, which is a vague predicate, so that the 
natural question arises: if truth is partial, just how right (or how wrong?) 
is a given instance of a partial truth? By which criteria is ‘partiality’ to be 
judged? Artigas does not give us any criteria here: only examples; and even 
the examples which he gives are not sufficiently detailed, as we will now 
see. His main example, in this section, is from classical mechanics:
If one formulates new laws, such as in the theory of relativity, the object of 
the theory changes, so a statement true in classical mechanics may be false in 
relativity. Nevertheless, this statement remains true in the context of classical 
mechanics. If one applies classical mechanics to bodies much bigger than atoms 
with velocities much less than the speed of light, one can form contextually 
true statements and intervene experimentally with success. (Artigas 2006, 142)
First of all, notice the move: as I discussed in 3.2.2, ‘contextual’ was used 
interchangeably, in Chapter 2, with ‘relative to certain scientific problems’ 
and-or ‘relative to certain methods’. Now, in Chapter 6, ‘contextual’ is 
apparently meant in the physicist’s sense instead: relative to a particular 
theory (classical mechanics) and, more specifically, relative to a specified 
range of values of the parameters of the theory (“velocities much less than 
the speed of light”). But these are conceptually different things, and the 
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latter is not necessarily just a further specification of the former. So which 
one should apply, and in which cases? In Chapter 7, Artigas will adopt yet 
another meaning of ‘contextual’: as referring to a conceptualisation, and to 
a characteristic objectification (Artigas 2006, 182). All of these meanings 
are remotely related to each other, but they differ significantly from each 
other. Artigas moves between those three uses without further warning. So 
it seems that there is nothing here by way of a clear theory of contextual 
knowledge or contextual truth.
Second, the inference made in the above quote is too fast. Even allowing 
ourselves to consider the notion of ‘contextuality’ as in Section 6.2 (i.e. as 
‘relative to a certain range of physical parameters’, independently from 
the notions of contextuality in Chapters 2 and 7): one cannot assume that 
any statement in classical mechanics is automatically contextually true 
in special relativity. Though some version of this statement may be true, 
the naïve claim is contentious and requires further qualification: it has, in 
fact, been discussed at length in the philosophy of physics literature. For 
instance, the pessimistic meta-induction argument is often based on this 
example. Also, construing ‘contextuality’ in terms of a ‘range of parameters’ 
is an intricate conceptual and technical problem in itself. For example, the 
mathematical fact that two sequences may converge in one topology, but 
not in another, means that even in the context of a single theory, deciding 
whether two quantities ‘agree with each other in a given range of parameters’ 
is a complicated question to which no a priori answer can be given (for 
a recent discussion in the context of general relativity, see Fletcher 2016). 
Artigas does not seem to be aware of, or be interested in, such problems. 
(In fact, he later shows, on pp. 167 and 171, that he is aware that there is 
a problem. But he does not solve it, nor does he explain whether it has any 
consequences for his reasoning: which makes things even worse, because 
it gives the impression that the above argument, at least without further 
elaboration, was a cheat!)
I am not criticising Artigas for not solving all of these problems in this 
book (which would, indeed, be an unreasonable expectation to lay on a single 
book). I am criticising him for: (i) not mentioning the problems and how these 
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problems affect his work (at least, not in the key places where he should have 
mentioned them!), (ii) not indicating how, at least some of these problems, 
can be solved or bypassed. For it is not the task of philosophy to uncritically 
systematise our common sense intuitions (not even the common sense 
intuitions of physicists). And in cases like this, in which the common sense 
intuitions have been challenged for good reasons, the philosopher must at 
least gesture at those objections, and indicate why the objections do not 
affect their work, if it is indeed the case that the objections do not apply to 
it—on pain of becoming superficial, incomprehensible, or simply incoherent.
3.2.5. Realism: from inter-subjectivity to objectivity
One of the most intricate problems in this book concerns the status of 
scientific realism, as a metaphysical ground for justifying the objectivity 
of knowledge.
Artigas has argued, in Sections 5.1–5.3, that:
The inter-subjectivity of experimental science is achieved through agreement 
about theoretical and experimental stipulations, and also through the acceptance 
of theories. (Artigas 2006, 122)
Sections 5.4–5.7 then discuss, or attempt to argue for, inter-subjective 
knowledge as a case of objectivity. The arguments here are not very conclu-
sive, because Artigas does not address the obvious threat which empiricism 
poses to science as a source of objective knowledge. Rather, Artigas seems 
to ultimately retreat to the position that “these stipulations are not arbi-
trary, and are justified by their success, that is, by their capacity to permit 
reaching the objectives of the science”. This may be so, but it would require 
elaboration. The objectives of science included knowledge, and it is the 
foundation of that knowledge that we are here trying to secure. So, should 
the objectives of science not be the endpoint of the argument, rather than 
an instrument used to justify stipulations? The argumentative structure is 
here unclear and unconvincing.
Chapter 6, and in particular its sections 6.1 and 6.3, seem to be set up 
as an answer to the question of how an inter-subjectively construed science 
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can give us truth (already also discussed in 3.2.2 above). Unfortunately, since 
contextuality did not receive a satisfactory treatment in earlier chapters, 
the arguments here are weak and inconclusive as well. I cannot find any 
substantive argument in this Chapter, which would allow us to move from 
inter-subjectivity to objectivity. Rather, Section 6.1.2 contains a rehearsal of 
arguments and examples which were already given before: a poorly worked 
out contextual theory of reference and meaning of terms. Artigas should at 
least have considered the standard arguments against such correspondence 
theories (also in other places, where he discusses conventionalism). For 
example, there is the standard problem of under-determination of theory 
by data: cases in which the same experimental and observational data are 
consistent with different theoretical descriptions. In such cases, it is not clear 
that a stipulation should lead us to truth (as Artigas does seem to assume): 
not even if we construe this truth as limited and contextual. One reason why 
this does not immediately follow is that, in the face of two possible theories 
describing the same data, it may be the case that one is right and the other is 
wrong (by other criteria), so that our stipulation for one of the two options 
simply gets it wrong. These objections can perhaps be resolved, but a lot 
more work is needed to be able to argue that stipulating a ‘wrong’ theory 
can, in some way or another, give us truth in some limited and contextual 
sense—or to find some other resolution. Artigas, despite his discussion of 
Duhem and Poincaré’s conventionalism, does not give any signs of having 
given serious thought to such problems.
Only in Sections 6.6 and 6.7 does it become clear why Artigas’s argu-
ments for the inference from inter-subjectivity to objectivity, discussed 
above, were ultimately unconvincing. The point is that his argument for 
objectivity works only on the assumption of scientific realism. But then 
Artigas, in somewhat of an anti-climax, declares:
explaining scientific realism is a still unfinished work, given the special features 
of the procedures used by experimental science. (Artigas 2006, 6.7)
First, science had been analysed (in Chapters 1–4) into a number of factors 
(including stipulations) whose cognitive objectivity needed to be justified. 
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To that end, recourse was taken, in Chapter 5 and in Sections 6.1–6.3, to 
scientific realism. Now, at the end of Chapter 6, we are told that realism 
cannot be fully explained. Without a discussion of the impact, of this 
explanatory gap of scientific realism, on the previous arguments, which 
relied on scientific realism, this is worrying. Furthermore, it feels a bit like 
a cheat, for the following additional reason.
‘Scientific realism’ is not a kind magic powder that grounds the objec-
tivity of science to our pleasing. ‘Scientific realism’ is just a generic phrase 
expressing our belief that science gives objective knowledge. Analysing 
science into factors, and grounding those factors on ‘scientific realism’, 
without giving some explanation of scientific realism itself, including 
independent grounds to be a scientific realist, is like doing nothing (unless, 
of course, one believes in magic powder). In other words, if we try to argue 
that factor F of natural science gives objective knowledge, and we do this 
by appealing to scientific realism, we should give independent reasons for 
scientific realism: for, on the face of it, scientific realism is nothing but the 
belief that science provides objective knowledge through factors such as 
F. So the spectre of circularity looms here again. The debate over realism 
vs. empiricism is precisely a debate over whether, and how, factors such 
as stipulations, theories, etc. justifiably lead to objective knowledge. For 
scientific realism to have any explanatory or grounding power, it needs to 
be specified and argued for.
Therefore, I doubt that Artigas’s argumentation will be convincing to 
many philosophers of science: and they are the target audience of the book, 
as mentioned in the quote in the preamble to this section. I do not think that 
they will be convinced, because Artigas is vague about what kind of scientific 
realism he has in mind (in other words, he is not clear about the meaning of 
scientific realism). He often uses a phrase like: one needs “a minimal dose 
of realism”. But this sounds like magic powder.
A more convincing argument, using scientific realism to justify the 
objectivity of (specific factors in) scientific knowledge, would have approx-
imately the following structure:
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(a) Provide independent reasons for why one is a scientific realist (these 
reasons may be of whatever kind: e.g. a no-miracles kind of argu-
ment, a Bayesian analysis of scientific success, etc.: but those reasons 
must be independent from the concrete factor which one wishes to 
justify).
(b) Based on these reasons, specify just what kind of scientific realism is 
needed, i.e. what kind of scientific realism the reasons (a) require. 
Thus answering the question: what does (a) require us to be scientific 
realists about?
(c) Confront the scientific realist position, constructed in (b), with 
the conceptual analysis of science (i.e. with science analysed into 
a number of factors), which one has obtained by an independent 
analysis.
(d) Based on (c), assess whether the version of scientific realism, con-
structed in (b), renders the knowledge provided by science objective 
(e.g. assess whether stipulations are justified as leading to objective 
knowledge).
If (d) does not render scientific knowledge objective, then one needs 
to either go back to (a) and rethink the arguments for realism, or else redo 
the conceptual analysis of science.
Artigas seems to skip several of the steps above: he begins with (d), i.e. 
with the analysis of the objectivity of the knowledge provided by science, 
but without having a proper notion of scientific realism. He then introduces 
scientific realism as a justification for that objectivity. But he does not inde-
pendently construct his form of scientific realism (b) from the reasons (a). 
So one gets the impression that, as a result, scientific realism is very much 
like magical powder: and we use the powder until our scientific knowledge 
is rendered objective.
3.2.6. Epistemology, rigour, and analytic philosophy
Let me end with three further, more general, points in which Artigas, though 
engaging with analytic philosophy of science, does not seem to do full justice 
to what an analytic approach to the philosophy of science would entail.
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First, as I have already argued above, Artigas seems unaware of the 
existence of basic philosophical problems underlying some of the philo-
sophical questions with which he is concerned. Knowledge and truth are 
leading themes of Artigas (2006): yet he nowhere gives us a construal of these 
notions, nor does he seem aware of the existence of the Gettier problem 
about the tripartite conception of knowledge, or of other analytic work on 
contextual notions of truth.
Second, Artigas seems to despise the mathematical rigour and axiomatic 
approaches which are characteristic of some analytic approaches (and, by 
the way, are also characteristic of a number of important contemporary 
approaches to theoretical physics: see e.g. developments in category theory 
applied to quantum field theory). His negative verdict here is partial, and 
possibly influenced by an idiosyncratic understanding of physics. Notice 
that axiomatic approaches to theories are, in reality, attempts at attain-
ing technical and conceptual clarity and can be very fruitful, leading to 
new insights. For instance, Artigas’s discussion of realism, reference, and 
semantic aspects of theories seems blissfully unaware of two important 
problems: (a) the problem of categoricity of formal models (originating, in 
its simplest form, in the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem in first-order logic, 
giving rise to non-intended or non-standard interpretations of the same 
formal structures), and (b) the under-determination of theory by data (which 
Artigas briefly mentions, but puts to no use, in connection with Duhem): 
discussions which, especially (a), can only be had once a theory has been 
axiomatised, or at least formulated on sufficient level of rigour.
Third, and perhaps more importantly, Artigas’s discussion of the ana-
lytic literature is, in my opinion, unnecessarily critical on the whole. Save, 
perhaps, the case of Popper, whom Artigas deeply admires, there seems to 
be nothing in logical positivism that might be of any use to Artigas. But 
I just gave examples of topics in logic and analytic epistemology which could 
have served Artigas well: the Gettier problem and its proposed solutions 
(including the contextual positions on truth), the problem of categoricity, 
and the problem of under-determination. Thus, though Artigas engages 
with analytic philosophy, his engagement is rather one-sided: usually only 
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aimed at criticism. This seems unproductive, also in light of the increasing 
prominence of analytic philosophy in Western philosophy, as evinced, for 
example, by the quote from Glock (2008) given in the Introduction.
Let me address an important general objection to the criticism in this 
Section: namely, the contention that Artigas does not attempt to achieve (is 
not interested in!) the kind of dialectical rigour which analytic philosophers 
do aim to achieve, and so that we should not judge him by such standards. 
But this objection is misguided: for being an ‘Aristotelian or Thomistic phi-
losopher’ should not be an excuse for allowing vagueness and inconsistency 
in philosophy. From Plato’s Socrates to Aquinas, the best of the classical 
tradition has always aimed at conceptual clarity and rigour: and so it is 
a mistake to think that clarity and precision are exclusively the demand of 
the analytic philosopher. The dialectical practices of the scholastic tradition 
may, in fact, be yet another bridge between classical and analytic philosophy!
Conclusion
In this essay I have explored Artigas’s engagement with analytic philosophy, 
especially in Artigas (2006). Artigas gives an original analysis of natural 
science based on scientific realism, and his conclusions seem, in several ways, 
to be in agreement with scientists’ intuitions about the truth of their theories 
and about how science describes nature. Artigas’s synthesis is articulated 
enough that it deserves further study. Thus I have argued that Artigas has 
the potential for becoming the ‘first philosopher’ of a philosophical school, 
on a specific conception of Whitehead’s.
But I also argued that, on Whitehead’s description of the first philoso-
pher of the school, Artigas’s work, in its present state, does not yet satisfy 
reasonable requirements of clarity and precision: containing too much 
vagueness, it cannot yet be shown to be inconsistent.
First, a systematic work of clarification is needed. I analysed in detail 
several substantive problems of Artigas (2006) which, in my opinion, render 
several central aspects of this work rather inconclusive and unconvincing, 
by common standards in the philosophy of science.
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Second, while Artigas (2006) is potentially interesting as a synthesis 
of a philosophical theory of natural science, the system lacks coherence: 
it is unclear why the system contains the elements it does, and not others. 
I illustrated this in the case of the notion of a ‘model’ (and there are many 
more examples): it is unclear what philosophical role models really fulfil 
within Artigas’s overall system: and it looks as if they could be eliminated 
without essential loss of information.
Third, the conceptual clarity of Artigas (2001, 2006) seems to be marred 
by Artigas’s undeniable erudition: specifically, by the large number of 
historical examples which he gives, and by the somewhat dubious use of 
the history of science in his argumentation: both as part of the (extended) 
definition of a concept, as well as a test case for the concept. As per the 
first point mentioned above, clear conceptual definitions would be needed 
which cover all known cases.
A further issue on which I have not touched upon in this essay, but 
which seems unavoidable, is that turning Artigas (2006) into a competi-
tive construal of natural science will require developing its metaphysical 
underpinnings in conversation with analytic metaphysics.
We can thus readily conclude from the three points above that Artigas’s 
acquaintance with analytic philosophy was incomplete and somewhat 
one-sided. He engaged in a debate with analytic philosophers but, ultimately, 
he did not himself apply the analytic methods, as one would expect from 
a work in philosophy of science. The result is unfinished work: a premature 
synthesis laid down as an interesting set of ideas, many of which can 
probably be rendered true upon suitable development, but which are not 
specific enough for Artigas to qualify, at this time, as the first philosopher 
of the school, in Whitehead’s sense.
That the above criticism is meant in praise of Artigas, follows from the 
general principle that only that which is highly valuable is worth criticising 
in some length, and in print. Artigas’s system, if further developed, could 
potentially be very fruitful. Further work by other philosophers is needed 
in order to finish what Artigas only began.
4(2)/2016 243
O N A RT I G A S A N D A N A LYT I C P H I LO S O P H Y
Acknowledgements
It is a pleasure to thank the members of the Centro de Investigación Ciencia, 
Razón y Fe (CRYF) of the University of Navarre, and in particular Santiago 
Collado and Javier Sánchez Cañizares, for interesting conversations over 
the last few years. This work was supported by the Tarner scholarship in 
Philosophy of Science and History of Ideas of Trinity College, Cambridge.
References
Artigas, M. 1963. El problema de la substancialidad de las partículas elementales: 
estudio sobre la aplicabilidad de la noción de substancia en la microfísica. PhD 
Dissertation, Lateran University, Rome.
–. 1979. La confiabilidad de la ciencia y su impacto filosófico. Doctoral Thesis, Uni-
versidad de Barcelona. A summary was published in Barcelona: Ediciones de la 
Universidad de Barcelona, 1980.
–. 1984. Introducción a la filosofía. Pamplona: Eunsa. English translation: Introduction 
to Philosophy. Manila: Sinag-Tala Publishers, 1990.
–. 2001. The Mind of the Universe. Philadelphia and London: Templeton Foundation 
Press.
–. 2006. Knowing Things for Sure. University Press of America.
Artigas, M. and J. J. Sanguineti. 1984. Filosofía de la naturaleza. Pamplona: Eunsa.
De Haro, S. 2013. “Science and Philosophy: A Love-Hate Relationship.” PhilSci 9864. 
http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/9864.
Fletcher, S. 2016. “Similarity, Topology, and Physical Significance in Relativity 
Theory.” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 67:365–389.
Glock, H.-J. 2008. What is Analytic Philosophy? New York / Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Kuhn, T. S. 1962. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press.
Laudan, L. 1978. Progress and Its Problems. Towards a Theory of Scientific Growth. 
Berkeley / Los Angeles / London: University of California Press.
Maritain, J. 1962. An introduction to Philosophy. London: Sheed and Ward
Ney, A. 2014. Metaphysics. An Introduction. New York–Oxford: Routledge.
Whitehead, A. N. 1978. Process and Reality. An Essay in Cosmology. Gifford lectures 
delivered in the University of Edinburgh during the session 1927–1928, edited by 
D. R. Griffin, and D. W. Sherburne. New York: The Free Press.
